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Title: Expressiveness, Efficiency, and Privacy in Advertising Auctions
Authors: Martin, David John
Keywords: Electronic Commerce
Sponsored Search Auctions
Winner Determination
Data Sharing
Background Knowledge
Issue Date: 8-Aug-2008
Abstract: Internet search results are a growing and highly profitable advertising platform. Search providers auction advertising slots to advertisers on their search result pages. Due to the high volume of searches and the users' low tolerance for search result latency, it is important to resolve these auctions quickly. Current approaches restrict the expressiveness of bids in order to achieve fast winner determination, which is the problem of allocating slots to advertisers so as to maximize the expected revenue given that advertisers are charged what they bid. The goal of this work is to permit more expressive bidding, thus allowing advertisers to achieve complex advertising goals, while still providing fast and scalable techniques for winner determination. To this end, we allow advertisers to submit programs that express complex and dynamic bidding strategies. We provide techniques for reducing the amount of program evaluation necessary to solve the winner determination problem, and we study the complexity of sharing aggregation computations between these programs. In addition, we also examine the problem of providing advertisers with data about search auctions without disclosing too much about any individual. We provide algorithms for both checking and enforcing privacy in this context.
Appears in Collections:Cornell Theses and Dissertations

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