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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/5676
Title: Belief in Information Flow
Authors: Clarkson, Michael R.
Myers, Andrew C.
Schneider, Fred B.
Keywords: computer science
technical report
Issue Date: 10-Feb-2005
Publisher: Cornell University
Citation: http://techreports.library.cornell.edu:8081/Dienst/UI/1.0/Display/cul.cis/TR2005-1976
Abstract: Measurement of information flow requires a definition of leakage, which traditionally has been defined to occur when an attacker's uncertainty about secret data is reduced. We show that this uncertainty-based approach is inadequate for measuring information flow when an attacker is making assumptions about secret inputs and these assumptions might be incorrect. Moreover, we show that such attacker beliefs are an unavoidable aspect of any satisfactory definition of leakage. To reason about information flow based on beliefs, we develop a model that describes how an attacker's belief changes due to the attacker's observation of the execution of a probabilistic (or deterministic) program. The model leads to a new metric for quantitative information flow that measures accuracy rather than uncertainty of beliefs.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/5676
Appears in Collections:Computing and Information Science Technical Reports

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